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SAVING MOM AND POP: ZONING AND
LEGISLATING FOR SMALL AND LOCAL
BUSINESS RETENTION
Dina Botwinick,*Jennifer Effron,** and John Huang***
INTRODUCTION
Small and local businesses often contribute unique character
to their municipalities, but advocates are concerned that large,
national, chain retailers, who offer lower prices and one-stop
shopping threaten the existence of smaller, specialized stores.1 In
response to these concerns, communities of varying size and
demographics throughout the country are using zoning
regulations and other legislative measures to assist small and
2
local business. Small and local businesses have always helped
define what is unique, diverse, and special about New York
City.3 In order to help promote their retention, the City must
also seek out innovative strategies that combine both regulations
* Admitted to practice law in the States of New York and New Jersey,
2009; Juris Doctor, Brooklyn Law School, 2008; Master of Forensic
Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 2002; Bachelor of Arts,
University of Florida, 1998.
** Juris Doctor, Brooklyn Law School, 2010; Master of Urban Planning,
Hunter College 2010; Bachelor of Arts, Tulane University, 2003.
*** Juris Doctor, Brooklyn Law School, 2008; Bachelor of Arts,
Michigan University, 2003.
1
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, The New Rules Project, Retail,
http://www.newrules.org/retail (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
2
See discussion infra Parts II and III.
3
Press Release, Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev., Saving Independent Retail:
Policy Measures to Keep Neighborhoods Thriving (Aug. 2009), available at
http://prattcenter.net/sites/default/files/publications/PrattCenter_SavingIndepe
ndentRetail.pdf.
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and incentives. This article reviews approaches employed by
other municipalities and considers legal issues that might arise
from them, with an eye toward small business retention in New
York City. Part I discusses the state of small and local
businesses in this economic crisis. Parts II and III provide an
overview of several zoning regulations and other legislative
measures enacted to aid small and local businesses in other
municipalities and indicates where such initiatives have sparked
lawsuits. Part IV considers potential legal challenges to these
laws, concluding in Part V with a brief discussion of how New
York City might consider moving forward.
I. SMALL AND LOCAL BUSINESSES IN TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT
Since the global financial crisis began in the last quarter of
2008, businesses of all sizes—from family-owned “mom and
pop” stores to national chain retailers—have suffered serious
economic hardships and many have been forced to close.
However, the current recession has hit small businesses
particularly hard, with 2009 arguably being the worst year since
the Great Depression.4 In November 2009, private sector
employment decreased by 169,000 and small businesses (those
with fewer than 50 employees) alone accounted for 68,000 of
those jobs.5 This, however, was the smallest decline since July
6
of 2008 and economic activity is beginning to stabilize —an
indicator that employment will as well. Small businesses make
important contributions to economic growth,7 and often even
4

Ian Mount, And 7 Businesses That Did Not Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/business/smallbusiness/31
deaths.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=“businesses%20that%20did%20not%20surviv
e”&st=cse.
5
ADP, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT REPORT 1 (2010), available at
http://www.adpemploymentreport.com/PDF/FINAL_Report_December_09.pd
f; see also Damien Cave, Family Businesses Are Reeling in Recession, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A12 (“Businesses with one to 19 employees, nearly
all of them family run, lost 757,000 jobs from the second quarter of 2007
through the third quarter of 2008.”).
6
ADP, supra note 5.
7
Cave, supra note 5.
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more important contributions to the neighborhoods they serve.8
As the country comes out of the recession it is important to look
to future policies that aid small, locally owned businesses in
order to assure that communities are more sustainable and
resistant to national and international economic cycles. New
York City relies on small businesses to provide job growth, tax
revenues, and a sense of community.9 It is especially important,
during economic downtimes, to help small businesses now and
in the future.
II. ZONING ORDINANCES
State and local governments often use zoning to control the
size, use, and appearance of improvements to real property. In
1926 the Supreme Court upheld states’ rights to control
development through zoning, holding that zoning ordinances are
a valid exercise of state police power so long as they bear a
rational relation to the health, safety, and general welfare of the
10
State enabling laws generally allow local
community.
governments to assume most of this responsibility. The four
commonly used zoning tools this Article examines are store size
caps, community impact reviews, neighborhood serving zones,
and formula business restrictions. Municipalities can combine
several of these tools to offer greater protections for small and
local businesses.
A. Store Size Caps
Store size caps limit the physical size of retail stores by
amending zoning ordinances, either for an entire city or for
11
designated areas within a city. Some municipalities put an
outright ban on stores above a certain size, while others limit
8

Press Release, Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev, supra note 3.
Nicholas Jahr, Maybe Beloved Shops Don’t Have to Disappear, CITY
LIMITS, July 21, 2008.
10
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–90 (1926).
11
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Store Size Caps, http://newrules.
org/retail/size.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
9
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their development to specific areas and, still others require
developers to obtain a conditional use permit from a town
authority.12 Since municipalities vary greatly in size, density, and
existing zoning, actual allowable square footage will vary from
place to place. Small towns and large cities across the United
States are using store cap sizes to protect small and local
businesses, decrease traffic congestion, lessen the burdens on
infrastructure, regulate building design, and maintain pedestrianfriendly districts, among many other planning goals.13 Fairfield,
Connecticut, San Francisco, California and New Elba, New
York offer examples of how store size caps are used.
1. Fairfield, Connecticut
Fairfield applies store size caps only in geographic areas
designated in the zoning ordinance as “Neighborhood Designed
Business Districts.”14 The purpose of these twelve districts is “to
provide local neighborhoods with needed and desirable
convenience goods and services in a manner which will not be
detrimental to the surrounding residential areas.”15
In July 2007 the Town Plan and Zoning Commission
amended the local zoning regulations to require that stores,
restaurants and banks in these designated areas not exceed 4,000
square feet in interior floor area.16 These districts also prohibit
drive-through restaurants and require a special permit for
construction of a “formula business,” which is defined under the
Fairfield Municipal Code, as a business
that includes, utilizes or incorporates any two or more of
the following standardized items that cause it to be
substantially identical to more than five other stores,
restaurants, businesses, offices or institutions regardless
of ownership or location: A standardized array of
12
13
14
15
16

Id.
Id.
See FAIRFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS § 12.5 (2009).
Id. § 12.5.
Id. §§ 12.5.1, 12.5.3, 12.5.15.
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products or merchandise, a standardized menu, uniform
apparel, standardized architectural design, layout or
façade, standardized décor or color scheme and/or
standardized signs trademarks, service marks or logos.17
2. San Francisco, California
In 1987, San Francisco created Neighborhood Commercial
Districts to establish a zoning system that could be tailored to
the unique characteristics of specific areas.18 The North Beach
neighborhood is one of these special districts, which traditionally
fostered small and locally owned businesses.19 Non-residential
uses in North Beach, 2,000 square feet or more, are permitted
only as a conditional use, subject to approval by the planning
commission in order to maintain a scale of development
20
appropriate to the district. A permit may only be issued after
the developer proves that the use would serve the neighborhood
needs and conform to the local architecture and style.21
Adittionally, non-residential uses in the North Beach
neighborhood exceeding 4,000 square feet are prohibited
outright.22 These requirements are intended to ensure the
17

Id. § 31.2.41.
S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 701.1(b) (2009).
19
Id. § 722.1. San Francisco amended this Article in 2008; however, the
relevant store size cap still applies to this discussion. Id.
20
Id. § 722.21. Section 303(c) sets out standards for reviewing uses that
exceed allowable square footage in Neighborhood Commercial Districts:
(i) large-scale use will not foreclose other needed neighborhood-serving uses;
(ii) use will serve the neighborhood and requires larger size to function; and
(iii) building design respects district scale. Id. § 303(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). Section
303(c)(2) requires that the use will not be detrimental to health, safety,
convenience, and general welfare of nearby persons. Id. § 303(c)(2).
Additionally, Section 303(j) requires the Commission to consider parking for
large-scale retail uses as it affects street front usage, degree to which design
encourages mixed-use, changes in traffic patterns, and increased demand on
infrastructure. Id. § 303(j)(A).
21
Id. § 121.2(a)(1)–(3).
22
Id. § 121.2(b). The 4,000 foot restriction “shall not apply to a Movie
Theatre use.” Id.
18
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livability and attractiveness of North Beach by maintaining the
existing scale of development, promoting a balanced mix of
retail, services, and restaurants, and preserving the equilibrium
of neighborhood-serving, city-wide specialty shopping and
dining uses.23 There are also many other San Francisco
neighborhood commercial districts where conditional permits are
required for non-residential uses from 2,500 square feet to 6,000
square feet.24
Beyond Neighborhood Commercial Districts, as a city-wide
measure, San Francisco amended the municipal code in 2004 to
require a conditional use permit for any single retail use over
50,000 gross square feet, except within downtown commercial
districts,25 which allow up to 90,000 gross square feet before a
conditional use permit is required.26 Further, single retail uses
exceeding 120,000 gross square feet are prohibited outside of
the downtown commercial districts.27 Such use is also prohibited
within the downtown commercial districts if the retail business
sells groceries, contains more than 20,000 stock-keeping units
(the lowest level of merchandise identification) and devotes more
than five percent (5%) of its total sales floor area to the sale of
non-taxable merchandise.28 Outside of the downtown commercial
districts these restrictions apply to new uses and the expansion
of existing uses, but within the downtown commercial districts
they apply only to new uses.29
A 2006 case decided by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California supports San Francisco’s
zoning approach. Wal-Mart Inc. v. City of Turlock upheld a
town ordinance that required a conditional use permit for certain
large retail stores and prohibited discount superstores (which
were defined as large-scale retail stores over 100,000 square feet
that also devoted more than five percent of sales floor area to
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

722.1.
121.2(a).
121.6(a).
121.6(b).
121.6(c).
121.6(d).
121.6.
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non-taxable items).30 The court found that the ordinance did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, because it was
rationally related to the state and local interests of regulating
traffic, air pollution, and urban blight.31 The court also found
that any indirect effect on interstate commerce caused by the
ordinance was far outweighed by the presumed benefits to the
city and therefore did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution.32
3. North Elba, New York
In North Elba, New York, a lawsuit prompted the town to
adopt a more stringent zoning ordinance. After being denied a
conditional use permit, Wal-Mart unsuccessfully sued the town
North Elba.33 The Appellate Division upheld the town’s denial in
1998, finding that its concern with the store’s negative aesthetics
was neither irrational nor arbitrary, and that it was not based on
impermissible considerations such as public sentiment or
community pressure.34 Subsequently, the town amended its code
to officially limit a single retail trade use to 40,000 square feet
of total floor area, even if spread out over more than one
building.35 The code further capped shopping centers and other
group retail business uses at 68,000 square feet.36
30

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1022
(E.D. Cal. 2006).
31
Id. at 1020.
32
Id.
33
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Planning. Bd. of N. Elba, 238 A.D.2d 93
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
34
Id. at 97.
35
NORTH ELBA, N.Y., TOWN LAND USE CODE § 4.17.1 (2009). This
amendment was clearly targeted at large-scale retailers as the average square
footage of the three main types of Wal-Mart stores, “Discount Stores,”
“Super Centers” and “Neighborhood Markets” were 107,000 square feet,
187,000 square feet and 42,000 square feet, respectively, as of August, 2007.
See Walmart Corporate, Our Retail Divisions http://walmartstores.com/
pressroom/news/5038.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
36
Id. § 4.17.2.
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B. Community Impact Review
Some communities do not prohibit large stores outright, but
require a community impact review prior to granting a
conditional use permit for large stores. The community impact
review requires developers to demonstrate that a proposed
development will not negatively affect the local community or
environment.37 Large-scale retailers, whose presence may
physically alter local character or may overburden the
community’s infrastructure, often trigger the community impact
review, causing delay and possibly deterring the development
altogether.38 A number of communities in the United States
employ this mechanism to provide a comprehensive review of
the impact on the local economy and community in areas such as
social services, tax revenues, downtown businesses, traffic
39
congestion, and pollution. Pursuant to state enabling statutes
and local ordinances, a review committee (often the local
planning commission), may authorize a conditional use if it finds
the proposed project meets certain criteria to properly address
the local community’s needs and mitigate adverse impacts.40
Brattleboro, Vermont and the State of Maine both use this
zoning mechanism.
1. Brattleboro, Vermont
In October 2006, Brattleboro, Vermont adopted an
amendment to its zoning ordinance to address large-scale retail
41
use. The amendment requires that “no single Retail Store,
37

Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Economic Impact Review,
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/economic-impact-review (last visited
Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Economic Impact Review].
38
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Community Impact Review: Vermont
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/economic-impact-review (last visited
Apr. 1, 2010).
39
See id. for a list of communities employing this type of review.
40
Economic Impact Review, supra note 37.
41
BRATTLEBORO, VT., MUN. CODE, ART. II, § 2337 (2007), available at
http://www.brattleboro.org/vertical/Sites/%7BF60A5D5E-AC5C-4F97-891A-
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Factory Retail Store or Supermarket shall have a Floor Area
greater than 65,000 square feet,” without undergoing site plan
and conditional use approval, as well as, satisfying additional
criteria set out in the Vermont State Statute.42 This ordinance
was drafted by the town’s planning commission, in response to
town concerns over big-box stores43 and give the The
Development Review Board (the “DRB”)44 the power to grant
conditional use permits to help monitor the influx of large-scale
retail businesses.45 In order to grant a conditional use permit, the
DRB must hold a public hearing and make findings that the
proposed use comports with general and specific standards set
forth in the zoning ordinance.46
A community impact review requirement is also included in
the amendment.47 This mandates that the permit applicant work
with a DRB approved consultant to analyze the project’s impact
on employment, the costs of public and social services
attributable to the development, the impact on property values
(especially in the immediate area), the extent to which the
project will affect other businesses in the area, and the amount
615C172A5783%7D/uploads/%7B2F2959C1-7B82-4448-9B1D-14A7B3F2
A45E%7D.PDF.
42
Id. § 2337(A).
43
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Community Impact Review:
Brattleboro,
VT,
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/economic-impactreview/community-impact-review-brattleboro-vt (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
44
The DRB is established in accordance with a referenced state statute
that authorizes such a board to be created and members to be appointed by
the municipality’s legislative body. Id. § 1400.
45
Id. § 1413.
46
BRATTLEBORO, VT., ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 1413, 2337(A)(2)(a).
General standards require the proposed use not adversely affect community
facilities, traffic, area’s character, the by-laws in effect, and use of renewable
energy resources. Id. § 1413(a). Specific standards may include requirements
for lot size, parking spaces, landscaping, and fencing. Id. § 1413(b).
47
Id. § 2337(A)(2)(b)(3). The other standards; (1) limit the location of
large-scale projects; (2) require its construction to encourage public
transportation, pedestrians, and cyclists; (3) require that the project comport
with the nature and character of the town, and is consistent with the town’s
growth plan; and (4) comply with enumerated aesthetic characteristics. Id.
§ 2337(A)(2)(b).
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of project-generated revenue that will filter back to the
community and region.48 At the applicant’s expense, the DRB
may also conduct an independent technical review of areas of
the application that are of “particular concern.”49
2. The State of Maine
Through the lobbying efforts of over 180 small businesses,
numerous municipal officials, and many labor, environmental,
and community organizations,50 Maine enacted a similar law
called the Informed Growth Act (the “Act”) in 2007.51 The Act
requires municipalities that have received permit applications for
large-scale retail developments (defined as any single-use space
75,000 square feet or larger)52 to determine whether such
development would have an “undue adverse impact” upon the
local economy and community.53 “Undue adverse impact” is
defined as development that negatively affects traffic, air and
water quality, as well as economic impacts, such as those on
other existing retail businesses, wages, municipal revenue, and
employment.54 A qualified preparer, selected from a preapproved list and agreed upon by the applicant and the
municipality is responsible for providing a “comprehensive
economic impact study”55 that addresses these factors.56 After
48

Id. § 2337(A)(2)(b)(3).
Id. § 2337(B).
50
Institute for Local Self Reliance, Community Impact Review: Maine,
http://www.newrules.org/print/retail/rules/economic-impact-review/
community-impact-review-maine (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
51
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4365 (2009).
52
Id. § 4366(6). This also includes expansions that would cause a single
space to be larger than 75,000 square feet unless the expansion is less than
20,000 square feet. Id.
53
Id. § 4367.
54
Id. § 4366(10).
55
Id. § 4367(1). The comprehensive economic impact study is prepared
at the applicant’s expense.
56
Id. § 4367(3). If the applicant and municipality cannot agree on the
preparer within 15 days, the municipality may select the preparer. Id.
§ 4367(2). The applicant must pay $40,000 to be deposited into a dedicated
49
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affording the public an opportunity to discuss the proposal,57 the
municipality’s decision-making authority may only approve a
permit if it finds that there is likely to be no undue adverse
impact.58 The Act applies to all municipalities in the state of
Maine, except for those that have adopted their own impact
studies for large-scale retail development, in accordance with the
Act.59
C. Neighborhood Serving Zones
Neighborhood serving zones are another zoning tool aimed at
helping to sustain small, local businesses by limiting the size and
type of retail stores in certain districts. These regulations serve
the everyday consumer needs of local residents and are not
aimed at attracting tourists.60 Palm Beach, Florida uses this type
of zoning.
Palm Beach, Florida created the Worth Avenue Commercial
District as a town-serving zone, where the size and type of
61
stores is limited by zoning regulations. The purpose of the
district “is to preserve and enhance an area of unique quality
and character oriented to pedestrian comparison shopping and
providing a wide range of retail and service establishments, to
be developed whether as a unit or as individual parcels, serving
the short term and long term needs of “townpersons.”62 New
retail stores in the district are permitted a maximum of 2,000
square feet of gross leasable area (“GLA”).63 The regulation
revenue account, from which the expenses involving the application are
taken. Unexpended funds are returned to the applicant. Id. § 4367(3).
57
Id. § 4368(1).
58
Id. § 4369.
59
Id. § 4371(1).
60
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Neighborhood Serving Zones,
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/neighborhoodserving-zones (last visited
Mar. 10, 2010).
61
PALM BEACH, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 134-1156 (2010).
62
Id. Townpersons are defined as full-time residents and visitors staying
in accommodations and employees working in town. Id. § 134-2(b).
63
Id. § 134-1157.
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allows any existing use that exceeds this GLA to change to a
similar type of commercial use without Palm Beach Town
Council approval, but requires a store exceeding 2,000 square
feet of GLA that wishes to change from one type of general
commercial use to another to obtain permission from the city
council.64 Furthermore, a business within this district may not
occupy an additional location within 1,500 feet of the original
business location.65 In order to obtain permission for
construction of a single store in excess of 2,000 square feet of
GLA, the regulation requires a showing that no less than 50% of
their customers will be townpersons.66
The Florida Court of Appeals upheld this regulation in
1991.67 In Handelsman v. Town of Palm Beach, a landlord
claimed that Palm Beach violated his right to Due Process and
Equal Protection under the United States Constitution when it
denied a special exception to convert a restaurant that existed as
a prior non-conforming use into an apparel store.68 The Court
found that the landlord retained his ability to use the property
within permitted use and size requirements and that the
ordinance was related to permissible public purposes.69 The
Court also found that the requirements as to the needs of the
townpersons reflected the town’s traffic and parking concerns
and its interest in preserving establishments that serve local
rather than regional needs.70

64

Id. § 134-1157(a)–(b). The code gives an example: If an already
existing 8,000 square foot ladies apparel store desires to change to an antique
store, it may do so without town council approval, but if the same store
wants to switch to a bank or an office building, it would need a special
exception from the town council. Id.
65
Id. There is an exception to this limitation if the two locations together
do not exceed 2,000 square feet of GLA. Id.
66
Id. § 134-229(12).
67
Handelsman v. Town of Palm Beach, 585 So. 2d. 1047 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
68
Id. at 1049.
69
Id.
70
Id. It should be noted that neither the neighborhood-serving aspect of
the ordinance nor the space limitation was challenged here.
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D. Formula Business Restrictions
Other municipalities protect local businesses by prohibiting
or deterring formula businesses, such as retail stores,
restaurants, hotels, and other establishments that adopt
standardized services, decor, uniforms, architecture, or other
features virtually identical to businesses located elsewhere.71 The
municipalities discussed below take different approaches to
limiting formula businesses. While Arcata, California limits the
number of formula businesses in certain neighborhoods,72 Bristol
Rhode Island limits the size,73 and San Francisco, California
requires conditional use permits in several districts and prohibits
these establishments entirely in two districts.74
1. Arcata, California
In June 2002, Arcata, California (population 17,000),
enacted an ordinance that limited the number of formula
restaurants in the city to nine.75 The ordinance stipulates that any
new formula restaurant that wishes to develop in the city
subsequent to the enactment of the ordinance may only do so if
it replaces an existing formula restaurant, which is further
limited to specified business districts.76 Outside of these
designated districts, formula retail is prohibited.77

71

Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Formula Business Restrictions,
http://www.newrules.org/retail/formula.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.3(e)–(f) (2009).
75
ARCATA, LAND USE CODE § 9.42.164. Arcata is about 5 hours north
of San Francisco, CA. The ordinance defines a “formula restaurant” as an
establishment that offers standardized food, uniforms, décor, or similar
standardized features that make that establishment substantially the same as
more than eleven other restaurants, no matter the location or ownership. Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
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2. Bristol, Rhode Island
In May 2004, Bristol, Rhode Island adopted an ordinance
restricting formula businesses larger than 2,500 square feet or
those occupying more than 65 feet of street frontage, from
locating in the town’s Historic District.78 The stated purpose of
the Historic District Zone is to “regulate the location and
operation of formula business establishments, within Bristol’s
Historic District Zone, in order to maintain the district’s unique
character and diverse blend of business offerings.”79
Formula businesses are not strictly prohibited from Bristol’s
Historic District, but must first obtain a certificate of
appropriateness from the Historic District Commission, and a
special use permit from the zoning board.80 The zoning board is
required to ensure that certain standards are met before issuing a
conditional use permit so that approval of a formula business
will not alter the unique character of the historic district or
contribute to a nationwide trend of standardized downtown
offerings.81 The board must also find that the proposed business
will contribute to a diverse and appropriate blend of businesses
in the historic district zone and that it will complement existing
businesses and aid in promoting the local economic base as a
whole.82 Further, the formula business must be compatible with
existing surrounding uses and it must be operated in a nonobtrusive manner that preserves the community’s character and
ambiance.83 To this effect, the ordinance prohibits drive-through

78

BRISTOL, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 28-150(h)(1)–(2) (2009).
Id. § 28-281(b). Restaurants, retail stores, banks, and hotels are
examples of businesses that are subject to the formula business
standard, which the ordinance defines as one that maintains a “standardized
(‘formula’) array of services and/or merchandise, trademark, logo, service
mark, symbol, decor, architecture, layout, uniform, or similar standardized
features, and which causes it to be substantially identical to more than five
other businesses regardless of ownership or location.” Id. §§ 28-1.
80
Id. § 28-281(d).
81
Id. §2-150(h)(1).
82
Id. § 2-150(h)(1)(a)–(c).
83
Id. § 28-150(h)(1)(d).
79
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windows, internally illuminated signs, and corporate logos.84
3. San Francisco, California
San Francisco’s 2004 zoning ordinance, discussed above,
also placed restrictions on formula businesses in order to
preserve neighborhood-serving retail operations and enhance
future opportunities for resident employment in, and ownership
of, such businesses.85 The city found that it could not effectively
maintain a diverse retail base if formula retail went unmonitored
in neighborhood commercial areas.86
The city specifically found that formula retail would unduly
eliminate small and medium-size businesses, which tend to be
more unique, and would skew the business mix toward national
rather than local, diverse retailers.87 Therefore, in specified
Neighborhood Commercial Districts (“NCDs”), formula retail
was prohibited outright, but generally permitted in all other
neighborhoods after the neighborhoods received notice.88
Moreover, the Planning Commission would only review formula
retail use upon request.89 The 2004 Formula Retail Use
ordinance also required formula businesses in other specified
NCDs to apply for a conditional use permit to the Planning
Department prior to commencing development.90 Conditional use
authorization required that the Planning Commission conduct a
public hearing and consider the number and similarity of other

84

Id. § 28-150(h)(1)(d)(3),(7),(8). This is a non-exhaustive list.
S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.3(a)(2) (2009). The Planning code
defines formula retail as a type of retail establishment with eleven or more
other retail establishments in the United States. Id. § 703.3(b). Formula retail
maintains two or more of the following features: standardized merchandise,
building design and color, apparel, trademark, or signage. Id.
86
Id. § 703.3(a)(9).
87
Id.
88
Id. § 703.3(e)–(f).
89
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Formula Business Restrictions: San
Francisco, http://www.newrules.org/retail/formula.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2010).
90
Id. § 312(d).
85
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formula retailers in that NCD, compatibility of the physical
appearance of the proposed establishment, the amount of
existing vacant retail space, and the mix of neighborhoodserving retailers with those that serve beyond the
neighborhood.91
Unsatisfied with the effectiveness of the 2004 ordinance, San
Francisco voters approved the Small Business Act through a
ballot proposition in 2006.92 The amendment requires all formula
retail uses in any NCD to obtain a conditional use permit from
the Planning Commission, subject to the guidelines set forth
above.93 The Planning Commission determines if “the proposed
use or feature, at the size and intensity contemplated, will
provide a development that is necessary or desirable for, or
compatible with, the neighborhood or the community.”94
Further, this amendment allows the Board of Supervisors to
adopt more restrictive provisions on permits for formula
businesses or to prohibit them from operating in any other
NCDs.95
III. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS BEYOND ZONING ORDINANCES
State and city governments can enact legislation beyond
zoning regulations that will impact small and large businesses in
different ways. As discussed below, some laws, such as local
purchasing preferences, commercial rent controls, and tax
breaks, are designed to help small businesses stay open, while
others, like living wage ordinances, are designed to discourage
non-unionized, large retailers (such as Wal-Mart) from opening
stores. These tools have all been used in different areas
91

Id. § 703.3(h).
Patrick McGeehan, Now, Big-Name Retail Chains Will Take the Other
Boroughs, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
01/14/nyregion/14chains.html?_r=1&sq=midtown&st=nyt&scp=2700&pag
ewanted=print. This amendment became effective in 2007.
93
S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.4(b). Formula retail uses are still
fully prohibited in the North Beach NCD as well as the Hayes-Gough NCD.
94
Id. § 303(c)(1).
95
Id. § 703.4(c).
92
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throughout the country at various times.
A. Local Purchasing Preferences
To generate more local economic activity, some states or
cities give preference to local businesses for public contracts.
Some will choose a local business when there is a tie bid with a
non-local business, while other laws mandate that the
government accept local business bids even when they are
higher, so long as the local bid is within a given percentage of
the lowest non-local bid.96 Local purchasing preferences are
intended to boost the local economy by providing more jobs and
greater tax revenue.97 Albuquerque, New Mexico and Wyoming
have enacted local purchasing preference laws.
1. Albuquerque, New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico enacted an ordinance to regulate
the allocation of contracts and designated purchasing preferences
for residential and local businesses in 1994.98 and recently
amended it to enhance preferences for small local businesses as
well.99 The ordinance regulates three types of business and the
situations under which they are to be given preference.100 A
“local business” is one whose principal office or place of
business is in the Greater Albuquerque Metropolitan Area.101
Local preferences apply to: requests for proposals, requests for
bids, and requests for quotes for purchasing goods or services or
102
for the award of concession contracts. “Resident businesses”
96

Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Local Purchasing Preferences,
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/local-purchasing-preferences (last visited
Mar. 10, 2010).
97
See id.
98
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 5-5-17 (2009).
99
Id. § 5-5-17(c).
100
Id. § 5-5-17(A).
101
Id. § 5-5-17(B)(1). The Greater Albuquerque Metropolitan Area is,
“all locations within the city and Bernalillo County.” Id. § 5-5-3.
102
Id. § 5-5-17(A)(1).
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refer to those businesses that maintain their principal office and
do business in New Mexico or New York.103 Pursuant to New
Mexico State law, residential contractor preferences apply to
construction contracts, and residential business and manufacturer
preferences apply to requests for bids or requests for proposals
for the purchase of goods or services.104 The Albuquerque
ordinance accounts for the state law, but sets forth that the
State’s residential business preference applies only when no
offers have been made by local businesses.105 Finally, “small
businesses” are local businesses that employ an average of less
than twenty full-time employees and are afforded slightly more
protection by the Albuquerque ordinance.106 A preference is
given to small businesses in their requests for bids, proposals,
and quotes for the purchase of goods or services.107 The stated
goal of the new ordinance is to include small businesses in at
least ten percent of total goods and services purchases;
therefore, small businesses do not have a preference over local
businesses, except as reflected in this ten percent goal.108 None
of these preferences apply to solicitations for purchase or
concession contracts for more than five million dollars, or if
federal funds or projects are involved.109
To determine whether a proposal or bid must be awarded to
a preferred business, the local, residential, or small business is
103

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-21(A)(1)–(2) (West 2009). New York
businesses are also given residential preference, because New York statutes
had recently barred businesses residing in States which discriminated against
New York state enterprises in their procurement of products and services
from selling goods or providing services to New York state agencies. See
N.Y. State Fin. Law § 165(6). This act eliminated the discriminatory
treatment so that New Mexico businesses would be allowed back into the
New York market. See ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES. § 131-21(A)(1)–(3).
104
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5-5-17(A)(3)–(4).
105
Id. A “resident contractor” has similar characteristics to a “resident
business.” Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-21 with § 13-4-2.
106
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 5-5-17(B)(5).
107
Id. § 5-5-17(A)(2).
108
Id. § 5-5-17(D).
109
Id. § 5-5-17(A)(5).
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given a five percent differential margin on its bid, quote, or
proposal.110 For instance, if a local business bids $100,000 for a
solicited project, and a competitor from outside the Albuquerque
metropolitan area bids $96,000, the city would be required to
accept the local offer, since the local bid is within five percent
of the lowest non-local bid.
In 2000, Bernalillo County, which is subject to
Albuquerque’s zoning amendment, appealed a lower court’s
ruling that mandated the county award a construction bid to a
local business when the local bid was within five percent of the
out-of-state bid.111 In Bradbury & Stamm Constr. v. Bd. of
County Comm’rs, the county argued that the statute gave it
discretionary power to determine whether the local preference
was practicable, regardless of the percentage differential.112 The
Court ruled that the local purchasing preference formula was
mandatory and provided no discretion for the city when the local
bid’s price differential is within five percent of the local offer.113
According to the court, a local preference was per se practicable
under the statute when the local bid was within five percent of
the non-local bid and the county had no further discretion.114
2. Wyoming
In Wyoming, state or local authorities can only award local
offers based upon preferential price differentials when
purchasing agricultural products, or constructing and maintaining
public structures, so long as they are not inferior to materials
115
A five percent price
offered from out-of-state suppliers.
differential preference may be given for Wyoming materials
when the contract is less than $5,000,000.116 Additionally, the
110

Id. § 5-5-17(B)(2).
Bradbury & Stamm Constr. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo
County, 35 P.3d 298, 299 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
112
Id. at 299.
113
Id. at 302.
114
Id.
115
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-6-105(a) (2010).
116
Id. §§ 16-6-105(a)-107.
111
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statute prohibits a resident bidder from sub-contracting more
than thirty percent to non-residents.117
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has upheld this local
purchasing preference against Equal Protection and Due Process
claims under both Wyoming and United States Constitutions. In
Galesburg Constr. Co., Inc. of Wyoming v. Bd. of Trs. of
Memorial Hosp. of Converse County, an out-of-state
construction company was the lowest bidder, but lost a
construction bid because its bid was less than five percent lower
than that of the lowest residential bidder.118 After determining
that the statute should not be examined under a strict scrutiny
standard, the court examined whether the statute served a
legitimate state interest and whether the statute was rationally
related to advancement of that interest.119 In so doing, the court
upheld the statute, finding that the local purchasing preference
furthered the state’s legitimate intent to encourage local business
through enhancing and stabilizing the local economy and tax
base by keeping revenues within the state.120
B. Commercial Rent Controls
Commercial rent control, like residential rent control, is
intended to cap the amount of rent that a landlord can demand,
thereby eliminating landlords’ incentive to deny lease renewals
for existing tenants.121 This functions to protect small businesses,
which are often unable to compete with larger, national retailers
who are able to pay much higher rents for choice locations. In
the current economic downturn, small and large retailers alike
are closing, but small businesses are being hit especially hard by
117

Id. § 16-6-103.
Galesburg Constr. Co. of Wyo. v. Bd. of Trs. of Mem’l Hosp., 641
P.2d 745, 747 (Wyo. 1982).
119
Id. at 749–50. The Court found that neither fundamental rights nor
suspect classification should be applied to corporations.
120
Id. at 750.
121
Free Advice, Landlord Tenant: What Is Rent Control, http://realestate-law.freeadvice.com/landlord_tenant/rent-control.htm (last visited Mar.
25, 2010).
118
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loss of sales,122 making it increasingly difficult to make already
high rent payments.123 In New York City, small business
advocates have seen this downturn as another opportunity to try
to pass new commercial rent control regulation.124 (The last
attempt was in 1984). A bill that would require landlords to
negotiate lease renewals with commercial tenants or face binding
arbitration, is awaiting Council vote as of the time of this
writing.125 Although no other jurisdictions currently use
commercial rent control, three cities in the United States have
enacted commercial rent control ordinances in recent history:
Berkeley, California (on three separate occasions beginning in
1978); Albany, New York (for a brief period during 1948); and
New York City (from 1945 through 1963).126 The current and
previous attempts to revive commercial rent control in New
York City, as well as the different regulations in Berkeley,
California illustrate how rent control assists small business.
1. New York, New York
New York City’s commercial rent control statute of 1945
expired in 1963 and stayed dormant until 1984 when City
Council members introduced a bill that would apply rent
controls to businesses occupying less than 10,000 square feet.127
The bill would have limited rent increases to forty-five percent
over five years for tenants in good standing.128 It called for

122

See supra Part I.
Christine Haughney, Stores Go Dark Where Buyers Once Roamed,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009.
124
Eliot Brown, Mom and Pop Go to City Hall, N. Y. OBSERVER, Nov.
23, 2009.
125
Small Business Survival Act, Proposed Int. No. 847-A (N.Y., N.Y.
2008).
126
W. Dennis Keating, The Elmwood Experiment: The Use of
Commercial Rent Stabilization to Preserve a Diverse Neighborhood Shopping
District, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 107, 124–38 (1985).
127
Michel Marriott, A Bill to Control Business Rents Is Called Flawed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1988, at B6.
128
Id.
123
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arbitration when landlords and tenants could not agree on a lease
renewal under that limit.129 Lawyers appearing before the
committee cited aspects of the bill that might pose legal
problems, including, (1) the city’s authority to enact such a law;
(2) the legality of using private-citizen arbitrators to determine
rents; and, (3) the limitation on a landlord’s fair return on his
investment.130 The bill was defeated at the committee level,131 and
commercial rent control was not considered again until recently.
In 2008, City Council member Robert Jackson introduced a
new rent control bill to address lease renewals for small, local
businesses.132 The bill applies to independently owned and
operated New York City businesses, with no more than 100
employees, where such business is not dominant in its field.133
Under this regulation, tenants would have the option to renew
their leases for a ten-year term, unless they lost that right for
specified reasons, such as consistently failing to pay rent, using
the space in a manner substantially different from what is
described in the current lease agreement or for conversion into a
different commercial purpose by the landlord himself.134 If the
landlord agrees to renew the lease, he and the tenant can
negotiate the rent or either party can compel non-binding
mediation.135 If after 90 days of negotiations and/or mediation
129

Id.
Id.
131
Council Panel Defeats Commercial-Rent Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1988, at B2.
132
Small Business Act, Proposed Int. No. 847-A §§ 22-801, 22-802(c)
(N.Y., N.Y. 2008).
133
Id.
134
Id. § 22-804(a), (d). Other grounds for non-renewal are: if the
landlord is going to perform major construction that requires tenants to
vacate; the tenant is using the space for illegal activities or permitting such
activity; substantial breach of substantive lease obligation without cure within
thirty days after written notice has been given to cure the breach; subletting
without notification by certified mail to the landlord and without the
landlord’s consent; or it has been determined that the tenant persistently
violates New York City tax laws or fails to obtain necessary licenses relating
to the premises or New York City’s laws. Id. § 22-804(d).
135
Id. § 22-804(e)(1).
130
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there is no agreement, the tenant must initiate arbitration in
order to retain the right to renew.136 The arbitrator’s rent
determination is binding and based on considerations including,
the rental market in the area, the condition of the space and
services provided, the landlord’s maintenance costs, and the
extent to which the business is bound to a particular location.137
However, if the tenant still does not agree to pay the determined
rent, he may remain in that space, paying no more than five
percent more than the previous year’s average rent, until such
time when a new tenant approaches the landlord.138 Even then,
the landlord must give the tenant the right of first refusal on a
bona fide offer from a new prospective tenant.139 While this bill
has significant support in the City Council, Mayor Michael
Bloomberg opposes it.140
2. Berkeley, California
Berkeley, California regulated commercial rental practices
three times, beginning in 1978.141 The first regulation, a ballot
initiative passed in November 1978, “required a partial rebate to
residential and commercial renters of the property tax reductions
received by the city’s landlords as a result of Proposition 13.”142
According to the regulation, eighty percent of a landlord’s tax
savings were to be credited to renters in the form of rent
reduction, and rent control initiatives were enacted to prevent
landlords from offsetting the costs of the rebate through extreme
rent increases.143 The initiative lacked effectiveness as it did not
create a means by which to enforce the law and it expired by its

136

Id.
Id. §§ 22-804(e)(3)(d), (e)(3)(f).
138
Id. §§ 22-804(e)(3)(f), (e)(3)(g).
139
Id. § 22-804(e)(3)(g).
140
Daniel P. Bader, Is the Small Business Survival Bill Dead?,
MANHATTAN TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at 10.
141
Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F. Supp. 820, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
142
Id. (internal citations omitted).
143
Id. (internal citations omitted).
137
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own terms on December 31, 1979.144
In 1982, Berkeley passed another initiative, establishing the
Elmwood Commercial Rent Stabilization and Eviction Protection
Program.145 Under the ordinance, landlords needed “good cause”
to evict commercial tenants or refuse to renew existing leases.146
The stated purpose of the Elmwood ordinance was to protect
commercial tenants who served local needs from rent increases
that were not justified by their landlord’s cost increases and to
test the viability of commercial rent control as a means of
preserving such business outside of the downtown district.147
Berkeley enacted its most recent commercial rent control
ordinance for another commercial district in 1986.148 The stated
purpose of the ordinance was “to preserve the unique character
of the Telegraph Avenue Area Commercial District and to
prevent business displacement by excessive rent increases and/or
149
The ordinance specified limited grounds for
evictions.”
eviction,150 coupled with an arbitration procedure to determine
144

Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
146
Id. (internal citations omitted). The eight reasons that constituted good
cause to evict were:
(1) failure to pay rent; (2) substantial violation of the terms of the
lease (other than an obligation to surrender possession at the end of a
term or upon notice); (3) committing a nuisance on the premises;
(4) using the premises for an illegal purpose; (5) refusal to execute
an extension or renewal of a lease upon expiration of a prior rental
agreement; (6) refusal to allow a landlord access to make necessary
repairs; (7) a landlord’s desire to recover possession to remove the
premises from commercial use; and (8) a landlord’s desire to recover
possession to make repairs that cannot be completed while the tenant
occupies the premises.
Id. at 824 n.3 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
147
Id. at 824 n.2 (internal citation omitted).
148
Id. at 825–26.
149
Id. at 826 (internal citation omitted).
150
Id. at 826 & n.6. The enumerated grounds for eviction are:
(1) failure to pay rent; (2) substantial lease violation; (3) committing
a nuisance on the premises; (4) using the premises for an illegal
purpose; (5) refusal to renew or extend an expired lease; and
145
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commercial rents.151 This ordinance was successfully challenged
for violating the Contracts Clause of the United States
Constitution.152
California has since banned commercial rent control by
statute, stating that it discourages commercial development,
discourages competition by giving an artificial advantage to
certain enterprises at the expense of others and has adverse
economic consequences statewide.153
C. Tax Incentives
Tax incentives can be used to protect small businesses in two
ways: (1) by rescinding tax breaks currently allowed to large
retailers; and (2) by providing tax incentives for small
businesses. Over the last twenty years, state and city
governments have attempted to use tax breaks and other kinds of
subsidies to bolster their economies by attracting or retaining
large retail chains.154 For example, as of 2004, Wal-Mart had
received about $1 billion in public subsidies from state and local
governments.155 However, there has been increasing awareness
(6) refusal to provide the landlord access to make repairs,
improvements, or to show the premises to prospective buyers or
tenants.
Id. at 826 n.6.
151
Id. at 826. Under the ordinance, “particular weight [was to] be given
to the first criterion, which require[d] consideration of the extent to which a
business contributes to the uniqueness and diversity of the Telegraph Avenue
Area and to the availability of goods and services in the Telegraph Avenue
Area and the city.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
152
Id. at 836. There was a claim under the Takings Clause of the United
States Constitution as well, but since the amount of compensation had not yet
been determined through arbitration, the claim was not ripe for judicial
review. Id. at 841–42.
153
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.25 (West 2010).
154
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Eliminating Subsidies for Big
Businesses,
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/eliminating-subsidies-bigbusiness (last visited, Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Eliminating Subsidies].
155
PHILIP MATTERA & ANNA PURINTON, GOOD JOBS FIRST, SHOPPING
FOR SUBSIDIES: HOW WAL-MART USES TAXPAYER MONEY TO FINANCE ITS

EFFRON FINAL.DOC

632

6/28/2010 2:48 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

that such subsidies do not produce the desired economic
effects.156 Although state and local governments are increasingly
less inclined to assist large retailers through the use of tax
subsidies, because large retailers already have a significant
competitive advantage over small businesses, a comprehensive
plan to protect small businesses will probably have to
incorporate both approaches of tax incentives to be effective.
According the Institute for Local Self Reliance (“ILSR”),
granting subsidies to large businesses is particularly unwarranted
in the retail sector, because this creates an uneven playing field
for locally owned businesses,157 and big retail stores produce no
net gain in employment or in wages paid.158 Some jurisdictions
follow this line of thinking, as evidenced by the State of
Arizona’s ban upon tax abatements for large retailers.159

NEVER-ENDING GROWTH 14 (2004), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.
org/pdf/wmtstudy.pdf. Good Jobs First is a self-described resource center for
grassroots groups and public officials which aims to promote corporate and
governmental accountability in economic development for working families.
See Good Jobs First, Who We Are, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/about_
us.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
156
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Years of Subsidizing Retail and
Nothing to Show for It, http://www.newrules.org/retail/news/yearssubsidizing-retail-and-nothing-show-it (last visited, Mar. 10, 2010).
157
Eliminating Subsidies, supra note 154. The Institute for Local Self
Reliance (“ILSR”) asserts that subsidies are rarely provided to locally owned
businesses, and that exacerbating the situation is the fact that the local
businesses will often see their tax dollars being used to subsidize their biggest
competitors. Id.
158
Id. The ILSR references a study conducted in Minnesota which found
that half of Minnesota’s recent subsidies were granted to companies paying
wages more than 20 percent below market levels for their industries. Id. The
ILSR also makes reference to a phenomenon that it terms “job piracy,”
whereby cities use tax incentives and subsidies in attempts to lure companies
from other cities or states. Id. According to the ILSR, “job piracy” produces
no real economic benefit, as no new jobs are created, only the relocation of
existing jobs. Id.
159
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-6010(a) (2010).

EFFRON FINAL.DOC

6/28/2010 2:48 PM

SAVING MOM AND POP

633

1. State of Arizona
In July 2007, Arizona adopted a law barring “municipalities
in the Phoenix region from providing tax breaks or incentives to
retail development.”160 The Arizona statute states that a city or
town within the Phoenix metropolitan area with a population
over two million “shall not offer or provide a tax incentive to a
business entity as an inducement or in exchange for locating or
relocating a retail facility in the city or town.”161 A city or town
violating this prohibition “is subject to a penalty equal to the
amount of the incentive realized by the taxpayer, extended over
a period of sixty months.”162 In this manner, Arizona is
attempting to eliminate the “subsidies” that certain municipalities
offer as incentives for large retailers to locate or relocate within
their jurisdiction.
One of the exceptions to the Arizona ban is of particular
interest. The statute does not apply to “[t]ax incentives for retail
business facilities in an area designated as a redevelopment
project, where the average household income is less than the
average city household income, as determined by the United
States census bureau.”163 This exception encourages
development, big or small, in poorer neighborhoods. As further
discussed below, big-box retail businesses in such areas may be
a mixed blessing, as they offer low prices to customers, but may
not pay employees a living wage.
D. Living Wage Ordinances
“Living Wage” ordinances usually require businesses that
have contracts with local governments to provide a specified
wage and benefits package that is higher than the federal
164
minimum. Since the mid-1990s, more than 140 living wage
160

Id.
Id.
162
Id. § 42-6010(B).
163
Id. § 42-6010(D)(3). Redevelopment projects are areas that relate to
slum clearance and redevelopment. Id. § 36-1471(17).
164
Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Living Wage, http://www.newrules.
161
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laws have been enacted.165 Municipal living wage ordinances
vary in their provisions, but the overarching goal of these
ordinances is to ensure that public contractors, employers, and
corporations receiving public financial assistance pay their
employees a specified wage and benefits package that is higher
than the federally defined poverty level.166 More recently,
Chicago, Illinois, and Lawrence Township, New Jersey, have
both proposed living wage ordinances specifically targeted at
formula retail businesses.167
1. Chicago, Illinois
In July 2006, Chicago, Illinois, became one of the first
municipalities to attempt to specifically target large retailers with
living wage legislation.168 The ordinance passed by the City
Council was vetoed by Mayor Daley, and did not have enough
org/equity/node/2067 (last visited, Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Living Wage].
165
Jeanette Wicks-Lim, Should We Be Talking About Living Wages
Now?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 11.
166
See Living Wage, supra note 164. The “Federal Poverty Level”
refers to the federal poverty guidelines issued each year by the Department of
Health and Human Resources and are used for administrative purposes such
as determining financial eligibility for certain federal programs. See Annual
Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,199 (Jan. 23, 2009).
As of February 2010, Congress had taken action to maintain the 2009
poverty guidelines in effect until March 10, 2010. U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services, 2009 Federal Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/
poverty/09poverty.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). With respect to a fourperson family within the 48 Contiguous States and the District of Columbia,
the poverty guideline is an annual income of $22,050. Annual Update of the
HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4,200. Accordingly, a person
working 40 hours a week would have to earn at least $10.60 per hour to earn
above the federal poverty guideline with respect to a family of four.
167
Big Box Living Wage & Benefits Ordinance, Proposed Municipal
Code § 4-404-020 (Chi., Ill. 2006); Large Retail Living Wage & Benefits
Ordinance, Proposed Ordinance § 1 (2006).
168
Big Box Living Wage & Benefits Ordinance, Proposed Municipal
Code § 4-404-020 (Chi., Ill. 2006). This ordinance was not limited to public
contractors or those receiving public benefits as most living wage ordinances
are. See id.
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support to override the veto.169
The proposed ordinance would have mandated that all large
retail employers in Chicago “provide employees an hourly
compensation package with a total value of no less than the sum
of the living wage rate and the benefits rate for each hour that
the employee works on the premises of a large retailer.”170 Large
retailers are defined as those with annual gross revenues of $1
billion or more and indoor square footage of 75,000 square feet
or more.171 The ordinance defined the “living wage rate” as an
hourly rate of $10.60, increasing by the annual “increase in the
cost of living.”172 “Benefits rate” is defined as an hourly rate of
$3.00, also increasing by the annual “increase in the cost of
living.”173 Large retail employers who failed to pay a “living
wage” would have been “required to pay the employee the
balance of the compensation owed, including interest thereon,
and an additional amount equal to twice the underpaid
compensation.”174 Large retail employers who attempted to
retaliate against employees would have been liable for “an
amount set by the agency designated by the city to administer
the ordinance or a court sufficient to compensate the employee
and deter future violations, but not less than one hundred fifty
dollars [$150.00] for each day that the violation continued or
until legal judgment is final.”175
2. Lawrence Township, New Jersey
In 2006, the Lawrence176 Living Wage Coalition conducted a
169

See id.
Id. § 4-404-020(a).
171
Id. § 4-404-010(d).
172
Id. § 4-404-020(b).
173
Id. § 4-404-020(c).
174
Id. § 4-404-070(f).
175
Id.
176
Lawrenceville and Lawrence Township are the same place. Lawrence
Township still uses the name “Lawrenceville” occasionally. The title of the
website is “Lawrenceville Living Wage Coalition” but all other references (in
the website’s article itself, as well as the newspaper articles cited therein) to
170
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successful petition to place a living wage ordinance aimed at
large retailers on its ballot.177 The stated purposes of the
proposed ordinance included (1) promoting wages and benefits
that allow working families to meet basic needs;
(2) safeguarding the economic well-being of the public; (3)
reducing the burden on taxpayers; and (4) ensuring that large
retailers pay their workers a living wage and encouraging them
to provide important benefits.178 The proposed ordinance targeted
“large retailers,” defined as retailers (1) having annual gross
revenues totaling $1 billion or more and (2) having an “indoor
premises” (which may be the aggregate of certain adjacent
stores) comprising 100,000 square feet or more.179 Large retail
employers would have been required to pay an hourly
compensation package of no less than the sum of the “living
wage rate” and “benefits rate” for each hour an employee
180
worked on its premises. The “living wage rate” was defined in
the proposed ordinance as “an hourly rate of $11.08—a wage
which would enable a full-time worker to earn an income that
will lift a family up to approximately 115% of the Federal
Poverty Guidelines for a family of four” and would be subject to
an annual cost of living increase.181 The “benefits rate” was
established as $3.50, also subject to an annual cost of living
increase.182
Two weeks after the Lawrence Township Council postponed
placing the the proposed ordinance on a ballot, a New Jersey
State Superior Court judge ruled that the local officials did not
have the power to change minimum wage standards in any

said Coalition are to the “New Jersey Living Wage Coalition.” See New
Jersey Living Wage Coalition, Lawrenceville Living Wage Coalition,
http://www.njlivingwagecoalition.org (last visited, Mar. 10, 2010).
177
Id.
178
Large Retail Living Wage & Benefits Ordinance, Proposed Ordinance
§ 1 (2006).
179
Id. § 2(c).
180
Id. § 3(a).
181
Id. § 3(b).
182
Id. § 3(c).
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way.183 An appeal was filed with the New Jersey State Superior
Court, Appellate Division, but was eventually withdrawn.184
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES
Although state and local governments may enact zoning laws
to protect small and local business, there are limits as to how
intrusively the government may regulate. As demonstrated
throughout this Article, small and local businesses may favor
these measures to protect their interests and preserve their
vitality, but such measures are potentially subject to legal
challenges.185 Specifically, if proposed legislation permits
preferences for local businesses over national businesses without
a rational basis, attempts to manipulate market forces, interferes
with private contracts between businesses, arbitrarily deprives an
owner of a protected property interest, attempts to regulate local
interests without authority from the state government, or exceeds
the scope of its authority from the state government, the
legislation may violate state and federal constitutional law.186 A
detailed discussion of the potential legal challenges explores the
viability of these tools in order to determine the best options for
protecting local and small businesses in New York City.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine may prevent
regulation involving community impact reviews, store size caps,
and formula business restrictions. While the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution gives Federal government the
power to regulate commerce “with foreign Nations, and among

183

Lisa Rich, Superior Court Judge Denies Bid for Minimum Wage Hike
on Ballot, TIMES (Trenton), Aug. 31, 2006, at A3.
184
Lea Kahn, Living Wage Group Withdraws Appeal, LAWRENCE
LEDGER, Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.njlivingwagecoalition.org/
press/articles/LawrenceLedger_2007-02-01.pdf.
185
See discussion infra Part IV.
186
Id.
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the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,”187 the Dormant
Commerce Clause, a product of judicial doctrine, applies to the
states even when Congress has not acted to regulate
commerce.188 Under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
state and local governments cannot regulate matters that
economically burden or discriminate against interstate
commerce.189 Land use regulations such as store size-caps,
conditional use permits, formula business restrictions and living
wage ordinances, which all address national chain retailers, may
be struck down under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Because
such chain stores are frequently incorporated out-of-state and
operate in “several states,” Commerce Clause violations are
commonly argued by businesses seeking to operate in various
localities.190
Under modern Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a
statute will almost always be struck down if it is facially
discriminatory.191 A facially discriminatory statute is one whose
language clearly makes a distinction favoring in-state commerce
over out-of-state commerce, or local commerce over state
commerce.192 Even if a statute is not facially discriminatory, it
may still be struck down if it was enacted for a discriminatory

187

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
Oltra, Inc. v. Pataki, 273 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)
(internal citations omitted).
189
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
190
Corporations are not protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the United States Constitution though, as it only applies to
individuals. See Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 210–11 (1945)
(affirming that a corporation is “neither a citizen of a state nor of the United
States within the protection of the privileges and immunities clauses of
Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution”).
191
See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487–88 (2005). But see
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (finding overtly discriminatory laws
may be upheld only if they serve a legitimate local purpose where
nondiscriminatory alternatives are not available).
192
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994);
Ore. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 107–08
(1994).
188
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purpose,193 or if its effects directly discriminate against out-ofstate competition for the benefit of in state economic interests.194
Such “protectionism” in direct purpose or effect is subject to
strict scrutiny by the courts, which requires that the government
prove that the regulation is narrowly tailored and the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling purpose.195 Strict
scrutiny is generally fatal to state or local regulation.196
However, if a statute is facially neutral (one which does not
explicitly discriminate against interstate trade)197 and the state or
local government can demonstrate that the discrimination served
a legitimate purpose unrelated to protecting local interests and
that there are no less discriminatory means to achieve their
permissible goals, the statute will usually pass judicial review

193

See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (finding
an excise tax on all wholesale liquor sales imposed by Hawaii, and exempting
local wines from the tax was purposeful discrimination because the alcoholic
products which the law exempted competed with different beverages
produced outside the state); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977). The test for standing articulated in Hunt has been
superseded by statute, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
§ 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 2010), as recognized in
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, 517
U.S. 544, 557 (1996).
194
See W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994)
(invalidating a subsidization program where, even though the funding tax was
applied evenly to the in-state and out of state producers of milk, only the instate producers would be assured that their taxes paid would be refunded
through the subsidy); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628
(1978); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
195
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1950); Baldwin, 294
U.S. at 524.
196
See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 568, 575, 583 n.16 (1997) (striking down a Maine statute
providing tax exemptions to Maine charitable institutions generally, but
providing only a more limited tax benefit on charitable institutions serving
primarily out-of-state clients); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525, 526–29, 545 (1949) (holding that a state may not deny operating
licenses to out-of-state distributors in order to stabilize the in-state milk
supply).
197
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 446–47 (1978).
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under the “Pike balancing test.”198 Under Pike, a facially neutral
statute with a legitimate purpose, and merely incidental effects
on interstate commerce, will only be invalidated if the burden on
interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” in comparison to the
local benefit.199 Because of careful drafting by state, city, and
town legislators, the statutes, codes, and ordinances addressed in
this article would likely face this lower level of scrutiny to
analyze whether the facially neutral statute is Constitutional
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.200
Regardless of meticulous drafting, however, certain zoning
ordinances will still run the risk of being overturned because the
burden on interstate commerce outweighs the benefit to the local
201
interest. This is especially true if the purpose or effect of
denying a development permit protects local business or
excludes out-of-state business. Protecting local economies at the
expense of outside competition is a discriminatory purpose.202
For example, the community impact review required by
Brattleboro, Vermont and the Maine State ordinance to protect
local economies have such a discriminatory purpose.203
Additionally, under San Francisco’s formula business restriction
Article 7,204 Section 703.3(a)(2) specifically references the need
to control the mix of businesses in the geographic area so that
the district is not unduly skewed toward national retail.205 This,
similarly, indicates a local preference. However, San
Francisco’s Neighborhood Commercial Districts, discussed in
Part II(A) of this Article, is a clear example of a zoning system
designed to protect small business, cap retail store sizes, and
198

See Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
(articulating the balancing approach).
199
Id.
200
See id.
201
See, e.g., Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 475 F. Supp. 2d
1281, 1289–90, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d, 542 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2008).
202
Id. at 1293 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 351–52 (1977)).
203
See supra Part II.B.
204
See supra Part II.D.
205
S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.3(a)(2) (2009).

EFFRON FINAL.DOC

6/28/2010 2:48 PM

SAVING MOM AND POP

641

withstand a Constitutional challenge under the Dormant
Commerce Clause.206 San Francisco’s Ordinance could serve as a
useful model for a New York City paradigm.
Careful crafting remains imperative. Discriminatory effects
challenges could be brought against store size caps and formula
business restrictions, as these types of restrictions may
discriminate by denying national chains (who are typically
incorporated out-of-state) their ability to buy and store in bulk
and maintain their competitive edge.207 By removing the
advantage out-of-state businesses have over local businesses, a
statute discriminates in its effect. For example, in 1989 a
Federal District Court in New York found that an ordinance
prohibiting fishing boats over 90 feet long violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause because, while it only applied to one local
vessel, there were at least ten out-of-state applicants who would
have had to either buy smaller boats or be excluded from the
market.208
However, national chains incorporated out-of-state, like WalMart, Exxon or Staples will not always win a Dormant
Commerce Clause claim against regulations with discriminatory
effects. For instance, in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
a Maryland statute made it prohibitive for Exxon to operate any
retail service stations within the state but did not prevent Exxon
206

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987 (E.D.
Cal. 2006). “The Ordinance’s putative benefits—avoidance of traffic
congestion, prevention of urban blight, minimization of air pollution, and
preservation of land-use objectives as to location and character of economic
zones within Turlock—are not so outweighed by any burden on interstate
commerce as to render the Ordinance unreasonable or irrational.” Wal Mart
failed to prove the imposition of “any disparate or other burden upon
interstate commerce” Id. at 1017.
207
See Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store SizeCapping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB.
LAW. 907, 941–42 (2005). Volume buying allows large national chains to
obtain price concessions from suppliers and is a key for national chains to
maintain lower prices than local businesses. Id. at 941. This requires large
spaces to display and store the goods bought in bulk. Id.
208
Atl. Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 893, 895, 897, 903
(E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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from operating in the state.209 The statute was enacted in
response to a petroleum shortage and complaints that petroleum
producers and refiners received preferential treatment during
shortages.210 The statute, therefore, uniformly required those
producers and refiners to offer a voluntary price reduction to
service stations supplied in Maryland. The purpose of the
statute’s discrimination in support of the Maryland market did
not distinguish between the out-of-state retailers, and its effect
did not prevent out-of-state retailers from operating in the
state.211 In so holding, the Supreme Court affirmed that the
Commerce Clause provides protection for the general interstate
market against undue regulatory burdens, not for only one
particular business or enterprise.212
Further, a recent case in New York illustrates how a court
may give deference to legislatures when a plaintiff alleges
discriminatory purpose and effect. In 1998, the Court in Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Town of East Hampton
dismissed a supermarket chain’s Dormant Commerce Clause
claim that the town’s store size cap was an undue burden on
interstate commerce.213 The Court found that although the
ordinance did seek to protect small businesses, it applied to both
in-state and out-of-state businesses alike. The Court also noted
that while some of the supermarket’s products came from out-ofstate, there was not even an incidental burden to interstate
commerce.214 The Court considered whether the law applied
evenhandedly to large and small businesses alike, rather than
comparing the disparate impact the store size cap would have on
215
out-of-state actors’ ability to bring their business into the town.
Finally, under the market participant theory though, state or
209

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 119, 121

(1978).
210

Id.
Id. at 126.
212
Id. at 127–28.
213
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Town of E. Hampton, 997 F. Supp.
340, 345, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
214
Id.
215
Id.
211
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local governments may favor local business over non-local
business without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause by
acting as a market participant. A government is a participant and
not a regulator when, for example, it is contracting for its own
construction project instead of regulating private construction
contracts. Thus, local purchasing preference laws216 favoring
government contractors are permitted through the market
participation exception. Developed in 1976, the market
participant theory illustrates the principle that while states should
not be able to regulate private trade in the national market, there
is no need to restrict a state from regulating itself.217 However, if
the state or local government is acting as a market participant, it
may not regulate commerce once it no longer has a proprietary
interest. For example, while the state of Alaska was selling
timber in the marketplace the state was permitted to regulate the
terms of sale as a market participant; however an Alaskan law,
which required all purchasers to process the timber in-state after
the sale and prior to shipping, was not protected by the marketparticipant exception. Once the timber was sold, the state no
longer had a proprietary interest.218
B. Equal Protection and Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that, “no state shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
219
laws.” Equal Protection and Due Process claims against land
use regulations typically allege injury to an economic interest,
but the regulation will be upheld so long as it is rationally
220
related to a legitimate government purpose. Commercial use
216

See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435 n.7 (1980) (citing
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976)).
218
S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984).
219
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphases added).
220
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926).
However, Courts are less deferential when the classification involves a
217
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zoning in New York City must be implemented in accordance
with a “well considered plan.”221 A well considered zoning
amendment is one that reflects the community’s changes and
growth and would, “benefit the community as a whole as
opposed to benefiting individuals or a group of individuals.”222
It will probably be difficult for a plaintiff to prevail on an
Equal Protection claim within this context. When permits are
denied based on store size caps, community impact reviews,
neighborhood serving tests, and formula business restrictions,
challengers claiming a violation of Equal Protection may argue
that the distinction was arbitrary and therefore an abuse of
power.223 However, the governmental unit has only to show that
there was a conceivable legitimate purpose for the legislation,
such as concern for traffic congestion, environmental hazards or
inadequate infrastructure.224 Also, municipalities can “enact landuse restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by
preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a
city.”225 Equal Protection claims could be made against living
“suspect class,” such as race or national origin or involves a fundamental
right such as the right to privacy or free speech. See, e.g., Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72, 376 (1970); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). Classifications between different size retailers will not
require this special protection. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485 (1970).
221
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2009).
222
Asian Ams. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265, 270 (N.Y. 1988).
223
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d
987, 995–96 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (ruling in favor of defendant city where
plaintiff Wal-Mart alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause because
its stores were situated similarly to a range of other retail forms with respect
to preserving traffic flows, air quality and preventing urban blight, yet the
city ordinance allowed the other retail forms and barred Wal-Mart).
224
See, e.g., id. at 1006 (holding specifically that the prevention of
blight was a legitimate state interest); Nelson v. City of Selma, 881 F.2d
836, 839 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the preservation of the character and
integrity of single-family neighborhoods, prevention of undue concentration
of population, prevention of traffic congestion, and maintenance of property
values, were all legitimate purposes of planning and zoning).
225
Trs. of Union Coll. v. Members of Schenectady City Council, 690
N.E.2d 862, 864 (N.Y. 1997) (quoting Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New

EFFRON FINAL.DOC

6/28/2010 2:48 PM

SAVING MOM AND POP

645

wage ordinances since they generally apply to large employers,
but governments can argue that larger businesses have a greater
impact on the economy and may be better able to absorb the
cost of paying higher wages.226 In 2002, New York City’s
Mayor Bloomberg signed legislation requiring a living wage for
all home health care and child care workers contracting with the
city; however, as of this writing the effort to expand a living
wage into the private marketplace remains a struggle between
City Council members.227
Plaintiffs are also unlikely to succeed in raising Due Process
challenges that allege the government is denying a property use
by restricting certain types of development or denying permits
without a legitimate reason. In order to succeed on a Substantive
Due Process claim, the property owner must first state a “valid
property interest in a benefit that was entitled to constitutional
protection at the time he was deprived of that benefit” and then
show that the government acted in an arbitrary manner in
depriving the property owner of that “protected property
interest.”228 A property owner is entitled to a land use only if an
agency does not have discretion to deny a permit.229 Further, the
standard for determining a Due Process violation under the New
York Constitution is the same as for determining a valid exercise
of police power,230 and land use restrictions are constitutional if
they are necessary to protect the public health, safety or general
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978)). In Union College, however, the
Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited educational uses in a Historic
District because historic preservation does not outweigh educational concerns,
as a matter of law. Id. at 863–64.
226
Memorandum from the Brennan Ctr. For Justice to Recipient (2006)
(on file with author).
227
Courtney Gross, Living Wage after Kingsbridge, GOTHAM GAZETTE,
Jan. 2010, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/work/20100115/22/3147.
228
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Town of East Hampton, 997 F. Supp.
340, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
229
See DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 132
(2d Cir. 1998). Procedural due process requires that zoning decisions follow
the proper rules of notification and hearings. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND
USE LAW § 2.41 (5th ed. 2003).
230
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 997 F. Supp at 350.
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welfare of the citizens.231 Size caps, formula business
restrictions, neighborhood serving zones, and community impact
reviews must still be able to show that their sole purpose is not
to prohibit big-box retail or favor local economic interests, but
rather one that is a legitimate governmental aim.
C. Takings
The United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment promise
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation”232 may be relevant in attempting to challenge
zoning regulations. 233 If a land-use regulation places too great a
restriction on the ability of a private property owner to develop
or maintain any economically viable use of that land, then it
may be considered a taking by the government and will be
invalidated unless the property owner receives just
compensation.234 While a regulation that deprives a landowner of
all economically viable uses is always a taking,235 such
236
circumstances are very rare.
237
For other regulations, courts will undertake a factual
inquiry as set out by Penn Central Transportation Company v.
New York City.238 A key consideration under the Penn Central
test is whether there is an interference with “distinct investmentbacked expectations.”239 If a regulation goes too far in limiting

231

Asian Ams. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E. 2d 265, 270 (N.Y. 1988).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
233
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to states through
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. See Chi., B. & Q. R. Co.
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
234
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–42 (1987).
235
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019
(1992).
236
Id. at 1017–18.
237
This applies only to those regulations that are not intended for
nuisance prevention. A law that regulates a nuisance is never a taking.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
238
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
239
Id. at 124.
232
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the value of the land or severely diminishes the developer’s
expected economic gains, it is considered a taking.240 While the
Court did not define what it meant by too far, it did say that
expectations had to be “reasonable.”241
Most zoning tools242 are susceptible to takings claims, for
which courts will look to the specific facts of each claim to
determine whether a regulation constitutes a taking. While
regulations that fall short of denying all beneficial use may still
be considered takings,243 a New York case found that even
substantial diminution in property value as a result of a
regulation did not necessarily constitute a taking.244
D. The Contracts Clause
The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution
states, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall . . . pass
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”245
The Contracts Clause is not a complete bar to legislative
alterations of contractual obligations, as “its prohibition must be
accommodated to the inherent police power of the State ‘to
safeguard the vital interests of its people.’”246 In Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., the Supreme Court
set forth a three-part inquiry to apply to the Contracts Clause.247
Under the Energy Reserves test, a statute will be struck down
240

Id.
Id. at 125.
242
See supra Part II.
243
Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 149–50.
244
De St. Aubin v. Flacke, 496 N.E.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. 1986) (“[T]he
property owner must show by ‘dollars and cents’ evidence that under no use
permitted by the regulation under attack would the properties be capable of
producing a reasonable return; the economic value, or all but a bare residue
of the economic value, of the parcels must have been destroyed by the
regulations at issue.”).
245
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
246
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S.
400, 410 (1983) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 434 (1934)).
247
Id. at 411–12.
241
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for violating the Contracts Clause if it (1) has operated as a
“substantial impairment of a contractual relationship”;248 (2) does
not have, in justification, a “significant and legitimate public
purpose”;249 and, based upon the legitimate public purpose
identified, (3) is not justifiable as a reasonable adjustment of the
rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties.250
Judicial review of a Contracts Clause claim begins with a
determination of “whether the state law has, in fact, operated as
a substantial impairment to a contractual relationship.”251 The
more severe the impairment upon the contracting parties, the
higher the level of scrutiny.252 Energy Reserves elaborates on the
“substantial impairment” requirement, noting that a statute
resulting in total destruction of the contractual relationship, or
even conversely, one restricting a party to gains reasonably
expected from the contract (even though the obligations under
the contract may be technically altered)253 would not necessarily
constitute a “substantial impairment.”254.
In Ross v. Berkeley255 the Court found that the commercial
rent control ordinance “applie[d] exclusively and explicitly to
248

Id. (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
244 (1978) (emphasis added)). The severity of the impairment imposed by
government is directly proportionate to its burden to show that the nature and
purpose of the legislation is for a valid state interest). Id. at 411.
249
Id. at 411–12 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22
(1977) (emphasis added)). Legislation must not be designed and enacted for
the mere advantage of particular individuals, but rather for the protection of a
basic societal interest. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445.
250
Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412. The balance between the
public purpose of the legislation and adjustment of the rights and
responsibilities of the contracting parties “must be upon reasonable conditions
and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its adoption.”
U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22.
251
Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural
Steel, 438 U.S. at 244).
252
Id. at 411.
253
Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 245.
254
Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 411. Furthermore, the Court
explained that the amount of previous regulation of the industry where the
contract is implicated is another relevant consideration. Id.
255
Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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the contractual obligations of the narrow group of lessors and
lessees in the Telegraph Avenue commercial district of the City
[of San Francisco] and confer[red] a direct benefit on one class
at the expense of the other.”256 This finding, along with the
severity of the impairments, led the Court to exercise heightened
scrutiny.257 In contrast, the Court upheld a Kansas court decision
finding a statute valid under the Contracts Clause, because at the
time the contracts were executed, “Kansas did not regulate
natural gas prices specifically, but its supervision of the industry
was extensive and intrusive.”258 As a result, the Court concluded
that the reasonable expectations of plaintiff, Energy Reserves
Group, were not impaired by the Kansas statute.259 This
conclusion, in conjunction with the finding of a legitimate public
purpose,260 led the Supreme Court to uphold the Kansas statute.261
If a court finds a substantial impairment, it will then decide
whether or not the impairment is justified by a “significant and
legitimate public purpose.”262 A legitimate public purpose is one
that does not focus on any specific enterprise or actor; rather, it
is aimed at fixing a broad economic or societal problem, or
enhancing the general welfare of the people.263 For example, In
Allied Structural Steel Co., the Supreme Court found a
Minnesota statute, which assessed charges against an employer
who closed its offices and discharged employees without
providing vested pension rights did not have a broad societal
interest.264 The Court found it “applie[d] only to private
employers who have at least 100 employees, at least one of
whom works in Minnesota, and who ha[s] established voluntary
private pension plans, qualified under § 401 of the Internal
Revenue Code. And it applies only when such an employer
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264

Id. at 833.
Id.
Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 413–14.
See id. at 416.
Id. at 417 n.25.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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closes his Minnesota office or terminates his pension plan.”265
The final inquiry is whether the adjustment of “the rights
and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon
reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the
public purpose justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.”266 This
requires the court to determine whether the relationship between
the impairment and the public purpose is sufficiently connected.
For example, the town of Islip, New York, “could not use a
zoning amendment to abrogate a prior subsisting lease in which
the town itself was a party.267 This holding was influenced by the
fact that the Town of Islip was a contracting party268 and should
not be construed as barring zoning amendments from changing
or voiding existing leases outright. Rather, any precedential
value will only apply to those leases to which a local
government, like the City of New York, is a contracting party.
The Contracts Clause is most likely to apply within the
context of commercial rent control legislation as this measure
affects existing contractual relationships. Consequently, any
commercial rent control legislation will have to set out its public
purpose rather carefully in order to garner maximum judicial
deference. Furthermore, the legislation will have to be
connected to its public purpose in a way that minimizes
“adjustments” to existing contractual relationships.
E. Home Rule and Taxation
Home rule is the legislative authority granted to local
governments to manage their own affairs without interference
269
from the state. Pursuant to the New York Municipal Home
265

Id. at 248.
Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).
267
Wa-Wa-Yanda, Inc. v. Dickerson, 18 A.D.2d 251, 258 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1963), aff’d, 238 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1968).
268
Id. at 256.
269
City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 1992); People ex rel.
Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, No. 62419, 1986 Ill. LEXIS 303, *5–6
(Ill. Nov. 20, 1986); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291,
266
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Rule Law, local governments such as New York City may
legislate local “property, affairs or government” matters.270
States typically restrict the scope of local authority with
respect to state affairs.271 New York’s highest court has
determined that matters of state concern, such as taxation, affect
residents of the entire state rather than only a particular
municipality.272 However, the methods, agencies, and
instruments to attain appropriate local government ends are
ordinarily matters under the purview of local governments.273
Municipal Home Rule authority grants local governments the
power to regulate land-use, in general.274 Taxation matters are
more complex: the use of any legislation regulating taxes to
protect small businesses will trigger an examination of whether
the Council of the City of New York would violate the scope of
its authority by enacting such legislation.275
CONCLUSION
Zoning regulations are the most common tool used to protect
296–97 (N.Y. 1972).
270
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i)–(ii) (McKinney 2010). A
general law is a law enacted by the state legislature, which in terms and
effect, applies alike to all counties (other than those wholly included within a
city), cities, towns, or villages. Id. § 2(5).
271
See Wambat Realty Corp. v. New York, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y.
1977). A state affair is “a matter in which the people of the State as a whole
[are] interested, as contrasted with a local affair in which the people of the
cities [have] the first and final say.” Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 708
(N.Y. 1929).
272
See, e.g., City of New York v. New York, 730 N.E.2d 920, 926
(N.Y. 2000) (finding taxation to be state concern); Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust
for Cultural Res., 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1291 (N.Y. 1978) (finding maintenance
of cultural institutions to be state concern); Adler, 167 N.E. at 710–11
(finding health of citizens to be state concern).
273
Browne v. City of New York, 149 N.E. 211, 220 (N.Y. 1925).
274
Yoga Soc’y. of N.Y., Inc. v. Monroe, 56 A.D.2d 842, 843 (N.Y.
App. Div 1977).
275
See City of New York v. New York, 730 N.E.2d at 925 (citing N.Y.
CONST. art XVI, § 1 (2010), which states that the power to tax rests solely
with the State Legislature, who may grant such authority to the City).
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small and local business, yet other tools have their own
advantages. For instance, conditional exceptions that include
community impact reviews are appealing as they allow
individual communities to assess their particular needs and
desires. In addition, courts tend to be more deferential to
regulations that allow land use proposals to go through a
substantive review process rather than being banned outright.
However, some other types of legislation intended for this
purpose may be less feasible than others. Commercial rent
control is generally unpopular, as many state governments think
it unduly interferes with free-market competition, discourages
development and provides little incentive for landlords to
maintain properties. Furthermore, tax incentives and living wage
ordinances typically trigger greater political opposition and may
require state as well as local action.276
All of the tools discussed supra potentially implicate one or
more Constitutional issues. Carefully drafting and tailoring
legislation and zoning ordinances is necessary to help ensure that
they do not violate the Constitutional rights of affected parties.
Although courts are generally deferential to zoning ordinances,
they must be enacted to protect the public health, safety or
general welfare.277 The sole purpose of any proposed legislation
or zoning ordinance cannot be to ban big-box retail or save
small and local businesses.278 Studies that support proposed
legislation, such as environmental impact statements, traffic
congestion surveys, infrastructure tests, or predictions about
potential vacancy rates will help an ordinance to withstand
judicial scrutiny, as they provide evidence that it is designed to
279
address issues of public health, safety, or general welfare.
When considering the feasibility of any particular tool, New
York City should consider the potential legal implications, and
draft carefully to avoid invalidation. Community education and
276

While New York City does have a living wage ordinance, it only
applies to employees of certain service contractors that do business with the
city itself. N.Y., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 6-109 (2009).
277
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
278
See supra Part IV.A.
279
See supra Part II.
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involvement may be the best way to guide development in each
district, as popular support is crucial to influencing government
to make changes that would protect small and local business.

